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Abstract 
The characteristfcs of recent capital  inflows into Latin America 
are discussed. It is argued that these inflows are partly explained by 
conditions outside the region, like recession in the United States and 
lower international interest rates. This suggests the possibility that 
a reversal of those conditions may lead to a future capi ta l  outflow, 
fncreasing the  macroeconomic vulnerability of Latin American economies. 
Policy options are argued to be lfmited. 
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During the p a s t  two years, Latin America has received s i z a b l e  inter- 
national c a p i t a l  flows, amounting to $24 billion in 1990 and $40 billion 
in 1991. In most cases, they have been accompanied by a marked accumulation 
in international reserves, significant appreciations in real exchange rates, 
booming stock markets, faster economic growth, and wider current account 
deficits. Although the restoration of voluntary a c c e s s  to international 
capital markets after nearly a decade has been heralded as a positive 
development, the resurgence in c a p i t a l  inf lows has a l s o  been a source of 
concern to polccymakers in the region, who fear ,  in particular,  that the 
accompanying real exchange rate appreciation w i l l  adversely af fect  the 
export sector. In addition, given that the previous c a p i t a l  inflow e p i s o d e  
was fol lowed by the debt cris i s  of the 1980s, there are fears that some of 
the capital k n f l o w s  are of the "ho t  money" variety. These highly specula- 
tive flows could be reversed on s h o r t  notice and, p o s s i b l y ,  spark a domestic 
financial crisis. 
This paper focuses on t w o  aspects  of the present c a p i t a l  inflow 
phenomenon. F i r s t ,  in an e f f o r t  to determine h o w  vulnerable these economies 
are to an unexpected reversal in c a p i t a l  flows, it assesses quantitatively 
to what extent the recent increase is due to external forces. Second, kt 
discusses the form and timing of the appropriate  policy response,  examining 
the pros and cons of a menu of p o l i c y  measures, including taxes on c a p i t a l  
imports, trade policy, f i s c a l  tightening, central bank sterilized and 
nonsterilized intervention, and banking regulations. 
The empirical analysis indicates that capital is returning to mast 
La t in  Amerfcan countries despite considerable differences in domestic 
p o l i c i e s  and macroeconomic conditions. External f a r c e s ,  particularly 
developments in the United S t a t e s ,  have played an important role i n  
inducing capftal flaws i n t o  Latin America. The sharp decline in U.S. 
interest rates, the continuing recesslon, and capital account developments 
in the United States have encouraged a p o r t f o l i o  s h i f t  toward Lat in  American 
assets. The policy analysis suggests t h a t ,  although external factors be 
reversed in the  future, it is dkfficult to advocate sterilized intervention, 
given t h e  fiscal burdens it entails, unless countries a d o p t  a strong fiscal 
stance and c a p i t a l  inflows are expected to be short-lived. A more cornpre- 
hensive policy intervention m i x ,  including r a i s i ng  marginal reserve 
requirements on short-term bank d e p o s i t ,  imposing t a x e s  on short-term 
c a p i t a l  imports, or a combination of these measures, are viable p o l i c y  
alternatives to deal with the possible detrimental effects of substantial 
capital inflows. 
I. Introduction 
The revival of substantial intexnational c a p i t a l  inflows to Latin 
America Is perhaps the  most notable and v i s ib l e  change in the economic 
situation of the regian during the last  two years. While capltal inf lows to 
Latin America averaged about $8 billion a year in the second half  of the 
1980s, they surged to $24 b i l l i o n  in 1990 and to $40 billfon by 1991. Of 
the  latter amount, 45 percent went to Mexico, and most of the remainder went: 
to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Interestingly, 
capftal fs returning to most Lat in  American countrfes despite the wide 
differences in macroeconomic policies and economic performance between them. 
In mast countries, the increased capital  inflows are accompanied by en 
appreciation in the real exchange rate, booming stock and seal e s t a t e  
markets, faster economic growth, an accumulation of international reserves, 
and a strong recovery of secondary market prices for foreign loans. 
Without doubt, an important part of this phenomenon is explained by the 
fundamental economic and political refarms which have recently taken place 
in a nuaber of these countries, including the restructuring of their 
external debts. Indeed, it would have been difficult to attract foreign 
cap i t a l  in the magnitudes mentioned above without  these reforms. 
Nevertheless, while domestic reform is a necessary ingredient for  capital  
inflows, it only p a r t i a l l y  explains Lat in  America's forceful reentry in 
international capital markets. For instance, domestic reforms alone cannot 
explain why capi ta l  inflows have occurred in countries that  had not  
undertaken substantial reforms or why they d i d  not  occur, until only 
recently, in countries where reforms where introduced well before 1990. In 
order f o r  domestic reforms to explain the  observed comovement a£ capital  
inflows across countries in the region, one would have to posit the 
existence of strong reputatfonal externalities (or "contagion" effects) ,  
where reforms in some of t h e  countries give rise to expectations of future 
reforms in other countries in the region. 
This paper maintains t h a t  some of the renewal of capital inflows to 
Latin America is due to external factors, and can be considered as an 
external shock common to the region. We argue that fa l l ing  interest rates, 
a continuing recession, and balance of payments developments in the United 
S t a t e s ,  along with developments in other industrialized countries, have 
encouraged investors to s h i f t  t h e i r  resources to Latin America t o  take 
advantage of renewed investment opportunities and the increased solvency in 
t ha t  region. IJ Taking i n t o  account economic developments outside the 
regian helps to explain t h e  universality of these inflows. From a 
historical perspective then, the present episode may w e l l  be an additional 
Latin America is n o t  the o n l y  region that has experienced increased 
capital  inflows in 1991. In fact, similar developments have occurred in 
A s i a  and the Middle East. A t  the same time, there had been a marked rise in 
capital  outflows from the United States and Japan. 
case of financial shocks in the Center that affect  the Periphery, of the 
type stressed by Diaz Alejandro in several of h i s  contributions. IJ 
International capftal  inflows affect the b t i n  American economies in at 
least four dimensions. 2J First, they increase the availability of 
capital  in the indiv2dual economies. As debt and equity capital become more 
mobile and accessible, domestic agents can better smooth out their 
consumption over t i r u e  and investors can more promptly react to changes in 
expected profitability. Second, capital inflows have been associated with a 
marked appreciation of the real exchange rate in m o s t  of the sample 
countries. The larger transfer from abroad has to be accompanied by an 
increase in domestic absorption. Assuming normality of tradable and 
nontradable goods, at the initial real exchange rate domestic residents plan 
to spend part of the transfer in  terms of tradable goods. This cannot be an 
equilibrium outcome because foreign transfers must, by definition, be spent 
entirely on tradable goods. Therefore, the real exchange sate has to 
appreciate in order to induce a s h i f t  away from nontradable and into 
tradable goods. 
Third, capital  fnflawa impose their own burdens and challenges on 
domestgc policymaking. The desfre by some central banks to attenuate the  
degree of real exchange rate appreciation in the short run frequently leads 
them to actively intervene and purchase from the private sector part of the 
inward flow of foreign exchange. Moreover, the attempt t o  avoid domestic 
monetfzatfon of these purchases has often led the monetary authorities t o  
steri l ize some of the inflows, which tends to perpetuate a high 
dornestic/foreign interest rate differential, and gives rise to increased 
fiscal burdens. The exrent to which the inflows are sustainable is also of 
concern to the authorities. The history of Latin America gives reason for 
such concern: the major episodes of c a p i t a l  inflows, during the 1920s and 
1978-81, were followed by major economic crises and c a p i t a l  outflows, such 
as in the  1930s and the debt crisis In the mid-1980s. 
Fourth, capital  inflows can provide important--yet ambiguous--signals 
to participants fn world financial markets. On the one hand, an increase in 
the inflows can be interpreted as reflecting more favorable medium- and 
long-term investment opportunities in the receiving country. Yet, on the 
other hand, capital  may pour in for purely short-term speculative purposes 
to a country where lack of credibility of government policies leads t o  high 
nominal returns on domestic financial a s s e t s .  In fact ,  there have been 
several such episodes in Latin America, where lack of credibility and a 
short- term financial bubble were assocf ated with large inflows of %ot 
money" from abroad. While it remains to be seen which one of these two  
scenarios best fits the present episode, she strong recovery in secondary 
market prices of bank claims on several of zhese countries (Chart 1) end 
See e . g. Diaz A l e  jandro (1983, 1984) . 
2J For a recent study of the effects of capital movements, see 
International Monetary Fund (March 1991). On the role of reforms and 
capital account liberalization, see Mathieson and Rojas-Suasez (1992). 
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various other indicators of country risk provide at least part ial  signals in 
support of the first, more favorable, scenario. 
7211s paper has three main objectives which are developed based on data 
for ten Latin American countries. 2J The f irst  is t o  document the current 
episode of capttal inflows to Latin Amer%ca and to compare it t o  earlier 
such episodes. The second is to quantitatively assess the role of external 
factors in accounting for the observed capital  inflows and the real exchange 
rate appreciation. The t h i r d  is to elaborate on the implications of capital 
inflows for economic policy in Latin American countries. The paper is 
organized as follows. Sectton I1 deals, with the basic concepts and the 
relationship between capital  inflows, the accumulation of reserves, and the 
gap between national saving and investment. The stylized facts about 
capital inflows to the region are documented in Section 111, which includes 
a comparison w i t h  previous episodes .  Section I V  provides a quantitative 
assessment of the role of external factors an the accumulation of reserves 
and on the real exchange rate appreciation in the ten countries considered. 
The implications of c a p i t a l  inf lows for domestic economic policy are 
discussed in Section V. 
11. The Accountinn of C a w i t a l  Flows 
International capital  flows are recorded in the non-reserve capital 
account of the balance of payments. This account includes all international 
transactions w i t h  a s s e t s  other than o f f i c i a l  reserves, such as transactions 
in money, stocks, government bonds, land, factories, and so an. When a 
na t iona l  agent sells en asset to someone abroad, the transaction enters h f s  
country's balance of payments as a credit: on the capital  account and is 
regarded as a capital inflow. Accordingly, net borrowing abroad by domestlc 
agents ar a purchase of domestic stocks by foreigners are considered as 
capital inflows, whlch respectively represent debt and equity finance. The 
methodology of the International Monetary Fund breaks down capital  flows 
into three main categories: fore ign  direct investment, port fo l io  
investment, and other capital. 
The simple rules of double-entry accounting ensure that, up to 
statistical discrepancies, the capital account surplus or net  capital inflow 
(denoted by KA) Is related to the current  account surplus (denoted by CA) 
and to the official reserves account (denoted by RA) of the balance of 
payments through the identity: 
1/ For tracing on the evolution over time of individual country ratings - 
see, for instance, LDC Debt R e ~ o r t  by Salmon Brothers. 
The countries included in our sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazfl ,  
C h i l e ,  Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
3/ Notice tha t  RACO implies accumulation of reserves by the monetary 
au&ority. 
A n  important property of the current account is that it measures the change 
in the economy's net foreign wealth. A country that runs a current account 
def i c i t  must finance t h i s  d e f l c i t  either by a private capital  inflow or by a 
reduction in its of f t c ia l  reserves. In both cases the country is running 
down i t s  net foreign wealth. Another important characteristic of the 
current account is that national income accounting implies that its surplus 
is equal to the difference between national saving and national investment 
( tha t  is, CA = S-I). Accordingly, an increase in the current account 
deficit can be traced to either an increase in national investment, a 
decline in national savings, or any combination of these variables t h a t  
results in an increased investrnent/savings gap. FSnally, the o f f i c i a l  
xeserves account records purchases or sales of off ic ia l  reserve assets  by 
central banks. Thus, t h i s  account measures the extent of official foreign 
exchange intervention by the authorities, and is often referred to as the 
o f f i c i a l  settlements balance or t h e  overall balance of payments (see 
footnote 3 an page 3 ) .  
The foregoing discussion indicates  that there are t w o  polar cases of 
central bank intervention under increased capital inflows. In a no- 
intervention scenario, the increased net exports of asse ts  in the c a p i t a l  
account are financing an increase in net imports of goods and services. 
Under these circumstances, capital  inflows would not be associated w i t h  
changes in central banks' holdings of o f f i c i a l  reserves. A t  the other 
extreme is s scenario in which the domestic authorities actively intervene 
and purchase the foreign exchange brought in by the capital inflow. Thus, 
the increase in KA is matched, one-to-one, by an increase in official 
reserves {recorded as a reduction in RA). In this case, there is no change 
in the gap between national saving and national investment, nor is there any 
change in the net foreign wealth of the economy. That is, the capital  
inflow would then be perfectly correlated w i t h  changes in o f f i c i a l  reserves. 
In rea l i ty ,  we observe fareign exchange market intervention but not on 
a scale that would produce a one-to-one relationship between reserves 
accumulation and capital inflow. Put different ly ,  the observed increase in 
capital Inflows to Latin America is partly matched by an increase in the 
region's current account d e f i c i t  and by an increase in central banks' 
off icial  reserves. The pertinent data are discussed In the next section. 
111. Stvlized Facts 
In this section we quantify some of the key aspects of the current 
episode of capital  inflows to Latin America and the related underlying 
macroeconomic developments. lJ To document the regional aspects of 
See also Financial T i m e s  (1992), Kuczynski (19921, and Salornon 
Brothers (1992). 
t h i s  phenomenon we aggregate annual data and focus on Latin America as a 
whole. a/ Monthly data f o r  individual countries provide greater d e t a i l  
and are also discussed here and in the sectton that follows. The current 
developments are then compared with previous episodes of capital inflow. 
L a s t ,  we elaborate on the role of external developments, especially those in 
the United States.  
1. Anatomv of capital inflows 
Table 1 presents a breakdown of Latin America's balance of payments 
i n t o  its three main accounts. The capital inflows under consideration 
appear in the form of surpluses in the cap$tal account, of about $24 billion 
in 1990 and about $40 billion in 1991. It can be seen that a substantial 
fraction o f  the inflows have been channelled to foreign exchange reserves, 
which increased by about $ 3 3  billion in 1990-91. About 63 percent of the 
i n f l o w  in 1990 was matched by an increase in official reserves, leaving the 
remaining 37 percent to finance the deficit in the current account. Y e t ,  
the latter increased markedly in 1991, accounting fox 55 percent of the 
c a p i t a l  inflow. considering 1990-91 as a whole, the net capita l  inflow was 
equally split into a widening in the current account d e f i c i t  (a reduction in 
CA) and an increase in o f f i c i a l  reserves (a reduction tn RA) .  The former 
suggests that capital  inflows have been assoctated with an increase in the 
gap between national investment and national saving. In countries like 
Chile and Mexico, an important part of the i n f l o w s  has financed increases in 
private investment; y e t ,  in countries like Argentina and Brazil there has 
been a marked rise in private consumption. 2/ The increase in o f f i c i a l  
reserves, in turn, indicates that the capital inflow was met with a rather 
heavy degree of fore ign exchange market Lntervention by the various monetary 
authorities. 
Part of the increased c a p i t a l  inflows represent repatriation of 
previous flight capital (whose stock abroad Is estimated at about $200 
b i l l i o n  at the end of the 1980s). 3J But, there also are new investors in 
Latin America. Table 2 reports various items fn the capital  account of 
Latin America. Notice that quantitatively the most important item is the 
increase in net external borrowing, which accounts f o r  70 percent of the 
capital inflow in 1990-91, and which is primarily borrowing by the private 
For the purposes of the present section, Latin America includes the 
same s e t  of countries included under Western Hemisphere in IMF's World 
Economic Outlook and International Financial Sta t i s t i c s .  
2J These figures, which are available from the authors, express 
investment and consumption as shares of GDP and rely on preliminary national 
income accounts data f o r  1991. 
On the role of various policy measures to reverse capital  f l i g h t  - 
such as amnesties, capital account liberalization, and introduction of 
foreign-currency denominated domestic instruments - see International 
Monetary Fund (December 1991) and Mathieson and Rajas-Suarez (1992). 

Table 2. Latin America: Items in the Capital Account 
(In biljims of U.S. doltars) 
Net external Nm-debt Asset tranmions Errors and 
Year borrowing creating flows (net) I /  ommissions 1 f Total 
1973 6.0 2.5 -- -- 8.5 
1974 11.7 2.2 -- -- 13.3 
1975 11.4 3.3 -- -- 14.7 
1976 14.2 2.7 -- -- 16.9 
1977 19.4 2.8 -2,5 -3.4 16,4 
1 978 28.0 4.9 -2.5 -3.1 27.4 
1 979 30.2 7.2 -2.4 -2.1 32.9 
1980 43.1 6.8 -3.0 - 13.0 34.0 
1981 61 -0 8.2 -8.9 - 17.5 41.9 
1982 45.7 7.2 -7.7 -22.1 23.0 
1983 18.7 4.6 -10.9 -8.8 13.6 
1984 14.1 4.5 -3.1 -3.0 12.5 
1985 6.2 6.1 -5.4 -1.4 5.5 
1986 11.3 4.3 -1.3 -1.9 12.3 
1987 10.0 6.0 -1.2 0,s 15.3 
1988 3,8 8.8 -4.3 -3.5 4.7 
1989 10.9 6.9 -2.1 -3.6 12.1 
1990 28.0 8.6 - 12.5 -0.2 23.9 
1991 f 7.3 14.9 6.7 1.7 39.8 
Swrce: Data for western hemisphere, World Ecmomc Outlook, IMF, various issues. 
11 These two categories are included in net external borrowing and mn-debt creating flows from 
1973-7 976. 
sector from foreign private banks. U Increased external borrowing 
reflects the restoration of access to voluntary capital  market flnancfng 
after the debt crisis--a restoratfon that follows a period of six years 
during which voluntary Loan and bond financing flows to Latin America were 
severely limited. 2J In addition to greater domestic borrowing abroad, 
there were increases in p o r t f o l i o  knvestment and foreign direct investment. 
The latter amounted to about $12 billion, $4 b i l l i o n  of which was the result 
of privatizations. 
Since there has been a substantial degree of central bank intervention 
in the face of capital inflows, there is an important degree of comovement 
between o f f i c i a l  reserves and capftal inflows. In fact, if one is 
interested in monthly developments, for which direct data on capital inflows 
are not  available, changes fn reserves are a reasanable proxy for these 
inflows, Chart 2, which d e p i c t s  monthly data on o f f i c i a l  international 
reserves for the countries in our sample, shows t h a t  for most of the 
countries, there is a pronounced upward trend in the stock of official 
reserves starting from about the first half of 1990. In 1991, the year w i t h  
the hfghest capital  inflows to the region, reserves accumulation accelerated 
as the monetary authoritkes in most countries reacted to the capital inflows 
by actively increasing their  purchases of foreign assets constituting 
international reserves. Brazil and Uruguay are exceptions to th i s  pattern, 
as in both countries, capital inflows were  not accompanied by an increase In 
reserves. 
2.  Real exchan~e rate a t e  
Chart 3 provides evidence on the behavior of the real effective 
exchange rates. 3J A t  least two  regularities emerge from th i s  figure: 
(I) with the exception of Brazil,  a l l  countries are experiencing a real 
exchange rate appreciation since January of 1991. In hal f  of the cases the 
real appreciation a£ the domestic currency began before January 1991; and 
( 2 )  even w5thin a small sample of monthly observations covering four years, 
there is considerable evidence a£ cyclical behavior of real exchange rates. 
Leading examples of this phenomenon are Brazil,  Chile, and Uruguay. While 
some of these cycles can be attributed to fluctuations in capital inflows, 
they are also the result  of other shacks such as fluctuations in the terms 
of trade and in domestic monetary, f i s ca l ,  and exchange rate policies. 
Combining the evidence from Charts 2 and 3 indicates t ha t  there is an 
important degree of comovement in these variables across countries, desptte 
the wide differences in policies and institutions among them. We v i e w  t h i s  
comovement as compatible w i t h  the notion tha t  there is a common shock t h a t  
Same of t h i s  increased borrowing may represent hidden repatriation of 
flight capital ,  
2J See, for instance, El-Erian (1992) and International Monetary Fund 
(December 1991. Chapter 111). 
The IMF indices of the real effect ive  exchange rate  are used, hence an 
appreciation is represented by an increase in the index. 
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affected the whole region and resulted i n  increased capital  inflows and real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
3. Rates of return differentials  
Expected rates of return en available assets across cauntrfes play a 
key role in investors' decisfons on whether or not to move capttal 
internationally. Since data for expected returns are not read5ly available, 
and depend on how one models expectations, we first look at the stylized 
facts in the farm of ex post returns (see Charts 4 and 5). 
As shown in Chart 4 ,  there was a large increase in the U.S. dollar 
stock prices of major Latin American markets i n  1991. Argentina exhibits 
the biggest s ingle  annual return of almost 400 percent, while Chfle and 
Mexico registered returns of about 100 percent each. lJ According to the 
"emerging markets" data from IFC, investments in Latin American securities 
yielded total returns of 134 percent in dollar terms in 1991. ,These stock 
market booms are associated w i t h  increased purchases by Latin American 
investors as well as by foreigners. The marked increases in stock market 
prices have resulted in skmflar rises %n the prices of country and regional 
market funds traded in the United States and elsewhere. Along w i t h  these 
price developments, there has been a maxked x i s e  in market capitalization of 
Latin American equity markets in 1991. Overall market capitalization in 
Argentina rose from $ 3 . 3  b i l l i o n  in 1990 to $18.5 billion i n  1991; in Brazil 
it rose from $16.4 billion in 1990 to $ 4 2 . 8  billion in 1991; in Chile from 
$13.7 billion in 1990 to $28 billion in 1991; and in Mexico it rose from 
$ 3 2 . 7  b i l l t o n  in 1990 to $101.2 billion in 1991. 2J According to Salomon 
Brothers, $850 b i l l i o n  of foreign investment entered Brazil's stock market 
in the  last four months of 1991, and about $600 million was invested by 
foreigners in the Argentine equity market in 1991. 3J However, as the 
figures indicate and Chart 4 confirms, the stack market booms and the 
attendant high returns appear to materialize after capital  has begun to flow 
in to the region. It would thus be di f f i cu l t  to argue that high stock 
market return differentials were responsible for a t t r ac t ing  the f irst  wave 
of capital  inf lows .  
Chart 5 provides evidence on the lending and deposit interest rate 
spreads between U.S. dollar equivalent domestic in teres t  rates and interest 
rates in the United S t a t e s .  Since kn some of these countries interest rates 
are regulated, and since c a p i t a l  mobi l i ty  is far from free, spreads across 
the various countries cannot be compared in a straightforward manner. In 
The price/earnings ratio in Argentina increased from 3.1 in 1990:IV to 
3 8 . 9  in 1991:IV; in Chile it increased from 8 . 9  in 1990:IV to 17.4 in 
1991:IV; and in Mexico it moved from 1 3 . 2  in 1990:IV to 14.6 In 1991:IV. 
These figures are from Emerging Markets Data Base, International Finance 
Corporation. 
2J These figures are from P g ,  
Fourth Quarter 1991, International Finance Corporation. 
See Salomon Brothers (February 1992). 
addition, as Chart 6 highl ights ,  the variability in domestic interest rates 
varies markedly across countries. To accommodate t h i s  feature the scales in 
Chart 4 vary from country to country, wkth Argentina and Peru having the 
broadest ranges and Bolivia and Colombia the narrowest. With these caveats 
in mind, the dominant impression from Chart 5 i s  that of relatively high 
interest dif ferentials  in Latin America in the 1990-91 per iod .  It is also 
evident from Chart 5 tha t  the pattern of spreads varies considerably across 
countries. In effect,  t h i s  is not  surprising since the monetary authorities 
in these countries have not  reacted in a uniform manner to the capital 
inflows and the timing of regulatory changes has also varied considerably 
across the countries considered. 
While the relatively high differential rate of return on L a t h  American 
assets has been associated w i t h  a marked rise in capital  inflows to the 
region, the inflows have not arbitraged away the large differentials. In 
some countries, such as Argentina, the interest rate differential decreased 
sharply as capital poured in; yet in others, such as Chile, there was a less 
pronounced response of t h e  interest rate differential to the inflows (see 
Chart 5). As argued in Section V, these different patterns may reflect  
cross-country differences in the authorities' choices between s t er i l i z ed  and 
nonstexilized intervention. In any case, it should be stressed that some of 
the relatively high observed differentials may be due to the fac t  that they 
are measured here ex post, as opposed to ex ante which is the one that is 
relevant for investor's decisions. I n  particular, as in a "Peso problem," 
s izable  discrepancies between ex ante and ex post returns could be accounted 
for by the fact that investors assigned a non-negligible probability that 
Latin American reforms could collapse, that capital controls could be re- 
imposed, that there could be large devaluations against the dollar, or that 
interest rates in the  United States could sharply rise. 
Y e t ,  even if there were direct data on expected, or ex ante, rates of 
return differentials, we suspect that these could well show substantial 
persistence over time due to the existence of financial and exchange rate 
risk. In fact, Chart 6 illustrates for both debt and equity instruments how 
in countries t ha t  provided high ex pas t  returns one also observes a 
relatively high variance of these returns. In addition, differentials may 
persist due to high transactions costs and information costs I/, capital  
controls, and country transfer (or political) risk. However, whether the 
observed differentials reflect these fundamental factors or are due ta a 
financial bubble is yet to be determined. 
In sum, three main s t y l i z e d  facts  emerge with regard to interest rate 
differentials. F i r s t ,  there is little comovement in domestic interest rates 
- 
I/ Some of the factors that make f t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  foreign investors to 
- 
invest in several Latin American markets are: the lack of full financial 
information about various traded companies, the absence of a comprehensive 
s e t  of insider trading regulations and of strict broker requirements in some 
cases, and the difficulties in dealing with standard accounting practices 
under high in f la t ion .  
Chart  4. STOCK M A R K E T  PERFORMANCE 
(Stock Price Indices In U.S. Dollars, January 1988= 100) 
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Chart  6 .  R I S K  A N D  R E T U R N S  
Credit Markets: Lending Rates of intersst 
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(in U.S. dollars), and hence in spreads, across the countries in our sample. 
Second, the "noise-to-signal ratio" of the domestic dollar rates varies 
substantially across countries. As Chart 6 illustrates based on ex post 
data,  countries offering the highest returns also had the greatest 
volatility of returns. Third, d e s p i t e  s izable  capital inflows the 
positive differentials have not been ful ly  arbitraged away. The persistence 
and s i ze  of thts wedge between domestic and foreign rates also appears to 
vary markedly across countries, 
4 .  Other macroeconomic develovments 
Selected macroeconomic developments are reported in Table 3 .  Consider 
how developments in 1991--the year when c a p i t a l  inflows grew to about 
$40 billion--differ from earlier years. First, there was n renewal of 
economic growth. A f t e r  three years of stagnation, real GDP increased by 
almost 3 percent in 1991. However, gross capital formation as perceht of 
GDP remained constant at about the  same level of the second half of the 
1980s suggesting a more efficient utilization of xesouxces. A t  the same 
time, there was a marked drop in the sate of in£ lation (which nevertheless 
remained at a three-digit level for t h e  region),  and a significant reduction 
in central government fiscal d e f i c i t s .  
The changfng economic conditions in Latin America are also reflected in 
the region's debt and solvency indicators. A t  $441 billion, external debt 
amounts to 2.6 times exports of goods and services. Although still high, 
this ratio has decreased markedly from the 3.5 figure in 1986. Since m o s t  
o f  Latin America's external debt ta comercial banks is still in terms of 
floating rates ,  the drop in shorr tern U . S .  interest rates and the drop in 
the debt to exports ratio has translated into a sapid decline in the 
external debt service ratio over the last two years. In fac t ,  the level of 
the debt service ratio in 1991 ( i . e . ,  32.8 percent) is of the same order of 
magnitude as the levels observed before the previous capital  inflow episode 
of 1978-81. As indicated above, capital inflows have been associated with 
rapid  accumulation of international reserves, which reached the record 
figure of $ 65.3 billion in 1991. As shown in Table 3 ,  the r a t i o  of 
reserves to irnporca was 33.5 in 1991, which is of a similar order of 
magnitude as in 1977 -78 .  
These developments represent only part of the changing economic 
environment in Latin America of the early 1990s. In addition to these, the 
move toward privatization and deregulation, the introduction of financial 
reforms, and the restructuring of existing external debt have a l l  
contributed to bringing Latin America back on the List of viable investment 
locations in world financial markets. Unfortunately, the fact that several 
An implication of thPs discussion is that from the investor's 
perspective,  the information content of a drop in U.S. interest rates is 
different from that  of an equal rise  in the domestic interest rate-while in 
both these cases the interest rate differential would change by the same 
amount . 

sf these variables could not  be quantified prevented us from including them 
in the econometric analysis of the next  section.  
It is useful te compare the present episode of capital i n f l o w s  w i t h  
earlier similar episodes. IJ The previous capital inflows episode 
occurred from 1978 to 1982, and was the precursor of the ensuing debt 
crisis. However, the data in Tables 1 to 3 highlight important differences 
across these two episodes. First, the capital inflows observebthus far  i n  
1990-91 are much smaller than in 1 9 7 8 - 8 2 .  In particular, capital  inflows 
between $45 billion and $50 billion were observed in each one of the three 
years 1980-82. This difference becomes larger i f  one compares the capita l  
inflows as a percentage of GDP; while capital inflows in 1978-82 represented 
7 percent of GPP at t h a t  t i m e ,  the capital inflows in 1991 are in the order 
of 4 percent of GDP for  tha t  year. Y e t ,  the difference would probably 
become smaller if changes in capital flight are taken i n t o  account. While 
in the earlier episode capital flight was increasing in most  countries along 
with increased (reported) capital inflows, in the present episode capital 
inflows appear to be accompanied by a decrease in the stock of flight 
capital  for these countries. 
Second, these two episodes differ in how the capital inflows are 
matched by changes in the other accounts of the balance of payments. While 
t he  present capital  inflows are accompanied by approximately equal increases 
Ln the current account d e f i c i t  and in o f f i c i a l  reserves, the l a t t e r  played a 
relatively minor role in the 1 9 7 8 - 8 2  episode. That is, most capital inflows 
in 1978-82 financed high current account d e f i c i t s ,  with the monetary 
authorities playing a less a c t i v e  role, Notice t h a t  the current account 
d e f i c i t  peaked in 1981 at 5 . 5  percent of G D P ,  while the d e f i c i t  i n  1991 is 
about 2 percent of GDP.  The combination of smaller current account deficits 
and the marked increase in o f f i c i a l  reserves in 1990-91 indicates that  
during the present episode there is less of a decline in Latin America's net 
foreign wealth than in the earlier episode and that there is more of a 
cushion against adverse shocks to capital flows in future per iods .  2/ The 
heavier degree of o f f i c i a l  intervention in forefgn exchange markets in the 
present episode may reflect the authorities' objectives t o  bring actual 
reserves-to-imports ratios back to their desired levels and/or to meet 
increases in t h e  nominal demand for money with foreign-reserves-backed 
monetization. 
Third, the set of underlying macroeconomic condkrions and t h e  behavior 
of fundamentals are now different from those in 1978-82 (Table 3 ) .  In the 
earlier episode inflation rates were increasing, as were government budget 
d e f i c i t s ,  and at the same time real GPP was growing at about 5 percent a 
1/ In fact, such comparisons are the subject of a separate research - 
project  the authors are preparing. 
2/ Notice, however, t ha t  the burden of foreign debt was larger at the 
- 
outset of the present episode than at the s tart  of the earl ier  episode. 
year. In the present circumstances, inflation is falling, although it is 
still high,  and governments are balancing their previous d e f i c i t s .  At the 
same time, there is now a recovery of growth in the reglon, which in the 
prevtous three years had b a s i c a l l y  disappeared. 
Bes ides  these differences, there are many simhlarities in the two 
episodes: accumulation of international reserves, real exchange rate 
appreciation, boornrng stock markets, and high differentials between domestic 
and foreign rates of return. The similarity exhibited by the behavior of 
stock markets then and now 5s  striking. In 1979, s t o c k  prices in dollar 
terms rose by 234 percent in Argentina, while in Chile they rose by 116 
percent and in Mextco by 63 percent--magnitudes in line w i t h  the experience 
in 1991. 
While more d i f f i c u l t  to document, another important episode of capital  
inflows to Latin America occurred in the 1920s, when the investment climate 
seemed reasonabLy good. As Diaz Alejandro (1983) notes, before World War I 
portfolio and direct investment i n  Latin America originated mainly in  
Europe. However, the 1920s were dominated by c a p i t a l  inflows from the 
United S t a t e s ,  while investments from Europe markedly slowed down. In 
particular, there was a pronounced expansion of public borrowing in the New 
York market at that time. Diaz Alejandro (1983) provides evidence of 
sizable investments by Britain and the United States in Argentina, Chile, 
Cuba, and Mexico. Toward the end of the 1920s, these t w o  major foreign 
investors had accumulated a stock of claims in Latin America of around four 
times the value of annual merchandise exports in that region. IJ 
An important lesson from these episodes is that the capital  inflows 
were eventually reversed in what turned out to be major crises. During the 
debt crisis of the mid 1980s, capital inflows to Latin America were reduced 
to about 20 percent of their earlier values, P u t  differently, the total 
amount of voluntary loan and bond financing flowing to  Latin American 
countrkes during the entire 1983-88 period was considerably smaller tha t  f o r  
1982 alone. As access to fnternational credit markets was curtailed and the 
capital account surplus dwindled, a sharp reduction in current account 
deficits became necessary, 
In the 1920s-30s episode, external factors resulted in a sharp fall in 
capital  inflows to L t i n  America toward the end of the 1920s, well before 
some of the countries in the region began having difficulties servicing 
their  external d e b t s .  Foreign capital markets dried up in the 1930s. While 
the increased burden of debt servicing in the cris i s  of the 1980s came via 
higher interest rates,  during the crisis  of the 1930s it came through a fall 
fn the dollar price level which led to a marked increase i n  the real burden 
o f  debt servicing. It is at th i s  p o i n t  that most countries suspended normal 
Thus, assuming a 5 percent rate of return Diaz Alejandro (1983) 
estimates t h a t  profits and interests on foreign capital must have accounted 
for about 20 percent of annual export earnings of the region. 
payments on their external d e b t s ,  protectionism and recessian abroad reduced 
other sources for foxeign exchange earnings, and a major crisls developed. 
Given these cycles o f  capftal inflows and outflows, it is not 
surprising that the current episode of capltal  inflows has given rise to 
some concerns about the p o s s i b i l i t y  of another crisis  in the future. While 
domestic fundamentals and indicators of country risk suggest  that the 
probabil i ty the capital inflow to Latin America in 1990-91 w i l l  degenerate 
i n t o  a serious crisis is not  high at this stage, the region is s t i l l  quite 
vulnerable to external shocks o f  the type stressed by Diaz Alejandro. This 
vulnerabilXty has p o l i c y  implications, some of which are discussed in 
Section V. 
External factors 
Although it is difficult to point to a single dominant external factor 
tha t  would account for the present cap5tal inflows to Latin America, several 
external developments have converged t o  stimulate such inflows. First, 
these i s  the lmpact of  the sharp drop in U.S. short-term interest rates 
which are now at about half their level a f  t w o  years ago and at their lowest 
levels since the early 1960s. For example, the interest rate on three-month 
certificates of depos i t  i n  secondary markets in the United States f e l l  from 
9.1 percent in 1989 to 5.8 percent in 1991 (the year of the largest drop),  
and to 4.1 percent in March 1992. By reducing the external debt service on 
floating rate d e b t s ,  this decline in  U.S. interest rates has improved the 
solvency of &t in  American debtors. For a given level of interest rates in 
Latin America, these developments provide incentives for repatriation of 
capital  held in  the United S t a t e s  and f o r  increases in borrowing by Latin 
American agents from c a p f t a l  markets in the United S t a t e s .  Beyond short- 
term interest rates, returns from other investments in the United Sta tes  
have decreased recently as well; e.g., in the real estate market. A l s o ,  
thexe was a 4 percent  decrease in U.S. corporate profits while corporate 
p r o f i t s  in the rest of the world (including Latin America) increased by 
10 percent in dollar terms. IJ 
Second, several external factoxs probably contributed to the increase 
in Latin America's current account deficit, and to the need to finance t h i s  
deficit by increased capital  inflows. Two such factors are the continuing 
recession in the United States and in other industrialized countries, and 
the continuation of  the  process of decline in Latin America's terms of trade 
throughout the Past decade--which ref lects  mainly a decrease in the prices 
of petroleum and of other commodities. In pr inc ip l e ,  a decline in a given 
country's terms of trade can be expected to xesult in a larger current 
account d e f i c i t  (the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect)  and, i n  the absence 
of major intervention by the national authorities, in a larger capital 
inflow to finance th i s  d e f i c i t .  Howevex, the changes in the  terms of trade 
As in subsection 3 above, these are ex pos t  developments that give 
only a partial indication of the ex ante rates of return, which are the mast 
relevant ones for investors' decisions. 
in 1990-91 (and even in the t w o  previous years) are t o o  s m a l l  t o  account for 
the sharp increase in capital  inflows; Latin America's tems of trade 
decreased by 1 . 2  percent in 1990 and by 5.2 percent in 1991. This pattern 
is in contrast: to earlier episodes in which terms of trade changes were 
probably the main shacks explaining fluctuations in the capital account; 
see,  e - g . ,  Dfaz Alefandro (1983) who doeuments tha t  between 1928/29 and 
1932133, there was an average decline of about 48 percent in the terms a£ 
trade of five Latin American countries. I/ In short, autonomous shocks to 
international capital flows seem to play a stronger role, and tems of trade 
shocks a weaker role, in accounting for the  capital inflows in the present 
episode than tn e a r l i e r  ones. 
Third, and re la t ed  to the foregoing discussion, it is remarkable t h a t  
durfng both recent episodes of capital inflows to Latin America--in 1978-82 
and 1990-91--there were sharp swings in the private capital  account of the 
U . S .  balance of payments $n the form of Increased outflows and reduced 
inflows (Table 4 ) .  In fact, 1990, and especially 1991 mark the first years 
of net capital outflows from the United States after e ight  consecutive years 
of net inflows! (And recall that 1991 is ~ h e  year of the largest drop in 
U.S. interest rates). 2/ T h a t  t h i s  change is associated with 
changes in the capital account of Latin America is clear from Table 5, where 
it is shown that about 60 percent of the increased capital  inflows in 1991 
are directly associated with increased private capital  outflows from the 
United States to Latin America, as recorded in the U.S. balance of payments. 
Similarly, the relatively large capital inflow of 1878-81 to Latin America 
was matched by increased private capital outflows from the United States, 
and the U.S. capital  inflow episode of  1983-89 was matched by increased 
capital  outflows from Latin America. 4J In our view, these data 
characteristics lend support to the notion t h a t  swings in private capital  
lJ The countries are: Argentina, Braz i l ,  Colombia, Cuba, and Mexico. 
2J Some examples of th i s  development are as fo l lows:  (1) there has been 
an increase in the  amount of investments in foreign securities by mutual 
funds in the United States. As of May 1992, the assets of stock funds that 
invest largely outside the United States stood at $41.8 b i l l i o n ,  more than 
twice the level at t he  end of 1988, and asse ts  of global funds have soared 
to $28 .5  billion from j u s t  $3 b i l l i o n  in 1988; ( 2 )  in 1991, the sale of 
foreign shares in public and private deals doubled, to a record $ 9 . 7 8  
b i l l i o n .  Bond deals rose b8 percent to $ 5 5 . 3 3  billion; 13) new foreign 
investment in U . S .  companies and real estate plummeted 66 percent in 1991. 
See The New Yark T i m e s  (July 5,  1992) and The Washington Post (1992). 
3J As indicated earlier, private capital outflows from Japan also 
increased sharply, by $36 billion, in 1991. 
It is useful to recall how sizable these inflows to the United States 
were in the mid-1980s (Table 4 ) .  From net capital  outflows of about $20 
billion a year in the late  1970s, the private capital account turned around 
in to  surpluses (capital inflow}, which peaked at $128 billion in 1985. This 
inflow, which mainly took the form of increased borrowing from abroad, was 
mostly used to finance hfgh and increasing current account deficits that 
were well above $100 billion in the second half  of che 1980s. 
Table 4. US,  Balance of Payments 
(m biPions of Was. dollxs) 
Capita! account plus net 
Year Current account Capitd account errors and omissions Overall balance 
1973 7.07 -9.71 - 12.30 -5.23 
1974 1.94 -9.25 - 10.75 -8.81 
1975 18.06 -28.67 -22.71 -4,6S 
1976 4.18 -25.24 - 14.68 -10.50 
1977 -14.49 - 1 8.46 -20.55 -35.04 
1978 - 1 5 , a  -30.63 - 18.08 - 33.48 
1979 O m  - 1 4.53 9.75 9.95 
1980 1.20 -35.91 - 1 O . B  -9.06 
1981 7.26 -20,07 - 8 3  - 1.24 
1982 -5.86 28.79 7.89 2.03 
1983 -40.18 24.72 36.13 -4.05 
1984 -98.99 72.52 99.7 1 0.75 
1985 - 12225 108.18 128.Q5 5.80 
1986 - 145.42 95.78 11 1.64 -33.78 
f 987 -16222 98.68 105.36 -56.86 
1988 - 128.99 101.05 92.72 -36.27 
1989 -106.41 104.91 123.34 16.93 
1990 -92.16 -4.643 58.90 -33.26 
1991 -8.66 -18.25 -21 .X -29% 
Source: International Financial Statistics and Survey of Current Business (various issues). 
Table 5. Changes in Capital Accounts 
(In billims of U. S. dollas) 
Private capital account of Private capita! account of 
1 1  Western Hemisphere U.S. with Western Hemisphere 111 
Periods compared (1 ) 12) 
1983-89 against 1978-81 -24.4 30.1 
I/ 1991 against 1W-89 30. I - 17.5 /I 
Note: Positive entries in column (1)  hdicae an increase in net private capital inflow te Western 
Hemisphere. A negative entry in column (2) indicates an increase in the net private capital outflow 
from the U.S. to the Western Hemisphere. 
outflows from the United S t a t e s  play  a key role as external impulses that 
affect the size of capital inflows into Latin America. 
Fourth, in 1990 there were important regulatory changes in capi ta l  
rnaxkets of industrial countries capital markets that reduced the 
transactions costs for agents accessing international capi ta l  markets from 
Latin America and other developing countries. lJ The most salient changes 
were the approvals of "Regulation S" and "Rule 144h" in the United S t a t e s ,  
which reduced transaction and liquidity costs faced by developing countries 
in approaching capital markets there .  In addition, the Japanese authorities 
lowered t he  m i n i m u m  credft r a t i ng  requirements far public bond issues on the 
Samurai market, from single A to t r i p l e  B. And in Switzerland, s t e p s  were 
taken in January 1991 to eliminate the minimum credit rating standards for 
foreign bond issues. 
IV. Role of External Factors; Econometric Analysis 
In t h i s  section, monthly data for t e n  Latin American countries covering 
the period January 1988 to December 1991 are used to analyze in more de ta i l  
key features of the current episode of c a p i t a l  in f l ow ,  The analysis begins 
by establishing the extent of comovment of o f f i c i a l  reserves and real 
exchange rates between these countries, as these proxy for capital  inflow. 
The dynamic relationship between these t w o  variables is then examined. 
Last, we develop and estimate a model designed to provide a quantitative 
assessment of the relative importance of external shocks in the recent 
episode of reserves accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation. 
1. Comovement a£ reserves and the real exchange rate 
Given the lack of monthly data on capital inflows, we examine here the 
jo in t  behavior of Pnternational reserves and the real exchange rate, two 
variables in the present episode that are closely assacfated with the 
inflows. 
The previous section revealed tha t  there is an important degree of 
cornovement in reserves and real exchange rates across countries, which could 
be interpreted as reflecting the effects of a common external shock to batin 
American countries (Charts 2 and 31, Accordingly, a first task in this 
section is to quantitatively examine this issue by using principal component 
analysis. P r i n c i p a l  component analysis provides a way of describing the 
cornovement in data serfes. 2J We begin with ten time series ,  reserves for 
each country, and construct a smaller s e t  of series, the principal 
components, whfch explain as much of the variance of the original series as 
4/ Our discussion here draws heavily on El-Erian (1992). 
2 J  For an exposition of principal components analysis, see, e . g . ,  Dhrymes 
(1970), Swoboda (19831,  in an application that is close in spirit to ours, 
used t h i s  approach to examine economic interdependence across different 
exchange rate regPmes for six of the G-7 countries. 
possible. lJ The hfgher the degree of comovement that exists among the 
original ten series ,  t he  fewer the number of principal components that will 
be needed to explain  a large portion of the variance of the original series. 
If the ten series w e r e  identical (perfectly collinear), the f i r s t  pr inc ipa l  
component would explain 100 percent of the variation of the original s e x l e s .  
Alternatively, if all ten series were perfectly uncorselated, it would take 
ten principal components to explain all of the variance in the original 
series; no advantage would be gained by looking at common factors, since 
none ex i s t .  
The procedure begins by standardizing the variables, so that each 
series has a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. This standardization 
ensures tha t  all series (in our case a l l  countries) receive uniform 
treatment and that the construction of the principal  component indices is 
n o t  influenced disproportionately by the series {countries) exhibiting t h e  
largest variation. 
We constructed the principal component indices for the period from 
January 1988 to November 1991. In additlon, for comparative purposes two 
subperiods are considered: 1988 - 89 and the capital  inflows episode of 
1990-91. As Chart 2 shoes and Table 6 confirms, the extent of comovement in 
reserves during the capital inflow period of 1990-91 is considerable and 
higher than in the preceding two  years. The first principal component 
explalns 67 percent of the variation in reserves, while the second principal 
component explains an additional 13 percent of the variation. Accordingly, 
80 percent of the vartance of the ten reserves series is captured by t w o  
indices, thus inhieating a s i z a b l e  degree of comovement. More formally, we 
t e s t e d  the null hypothesis that the t en  reserve series are linearly 
independent and found that we could reject this hypothesis at standard 
significance levels. 2J 
Applying the same procedure to the real exchange rate indicates that 
the degree of eomovement across countries in the region also has increased 
in the recent capital  inflows episode .  The fraction of real exchange rate 
variance explained by the ffrst: princfpal component during 1990-91, 58 
percent, is substantial although it is somewhat lower than for  reserves. 
The f irst  two principal components explain a sizable 79 percent of the 
variance of the real ef fec t ive  exchange rate. A number of factors, such as 
cross-country differences in exchange rate  regimes and in the degrees of 
wage and price flexibility, are likely to account f o r  the lower degree of 
comovement observed in the real exchange rate when compared to reserves. 
As far as the increased covnsiation of reserves and the real exchange 
rate in the recent period is concerned, it may well reflect the effects of 
- 
All the analysis that follows uses the logs of reserves and of the 
real exchange rate. 
2/ The test statistics, which are distributed as a X2 with 4 5  degrees af 
freedom, and the attendant probability values are presented at the bottom of 
Table 6 .  
- 2 1  - 
Table 6. Eetablishing the Comavement Jn Maeroeconomle Series 
Notes: The cumulative R? givas the percentage of the variance of the original seriaa explained by the 
first pricipal component, the first two principal components, and so on. 
I 
Table 7 .  Contemporaneous Correlations of the Regional Variables with Selected U.S. lndleators 
'F988:I to 1991:ll 
-- -- 
1988:l to 1991:11 198B:Ito1989:12 1990:t tol9Of:ll 
Cumulatbe R Cwrrulat)re FP Cumulative RZ 
REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
First Principal Component 0.44 0.41 0.68 
Second Princiipal Component 0.73 0.78 0.79 
C hi-Squared(45) 302.0 1 286.3 1 
Probability value (0.0000) (0.0000) 
RESERVES 
First Principal Component 0.61 0.48 0.67 
Second Principal Component 0.77 0.69 0.80 
Chi-Squared (45) 204.97 297.23 
Probability vale@ (0.0000) (0,0000) 
U.S. Variables Flrat Principal Component First Principal Component 
of Rssewes of t h e  Real Exchanga Rate 
Treasury Bill Rate -0.922 -0.603 
Certificate of Deposit -0.928 -0.694 
Commercial Papsr -0.926 -0.691 
Treasury Long Bond -0.696 -0.668 
I -month Capital Gain is S & P 500 0.001 -0.107 
12-month Capital Gain in S L P 500 -0.086 0.136 
1-month Ceplfal Gain is Real Estate ' I  -0.095 -0.041 
12-month Capital Gain Is  Reel Estate ' I  -0.445 -0.707 
Deviations from Trend in Real -0.939 -0.730 
DisposabIe Income 
DOMESTIC INFLATIOH RATE 
t 2-month percent change 
First Principal Component 0.37 0.80 0.45 
Second Principal Component 0.57 0.88 0.64 
Chi-Squared (45) 435.94 306.4 
Probability value (0.0000) (0.0000) 
- 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF and Data Resources Incorporated. 
1 I Measured using prices of existing homes. 
an external shock, common to the region, in the Past t w o  years. 
Interestingly, when we examined the  principal components of the domestic 
inflation rate, a variable less obviously linked to external factors, we 
found that  the extent of covariation among the inflation rates of these ten 
countries had diminished rather than increased in the recent period. 
The correlations between the f i r s t  pr inc ipal  component of reserves and 
the individual country reserve series tend to confirm the evidence in Chart 
2.  The regional index does quite well in accounting for reserve 
fluctuations in eight countries, with Brazil and Uruguay proving the 
exception.  For the real exchange rate,  the results are also anticipated in 
Chart 3 .  L/ 
The first  principal  components (plotted in Chart 7) could be 
interpreted as regional exchange rate and reserves indices.  Purged of 
country-specific idiesyncracies, they could reflect the influence of 
unobservable external factors common to the region as well as any 
coordinated internal developments in the region. To explore the p o s s i b l e  
role of external factors, Table 7 shows the correlation between the first 
principal components f o r  reserves and the real exchange rate and a s e t  of 
variables from the United States. The latter  includes the nominal rates of 
return on real estate, stock and bond markets, short-term deposit and 
lending rates eE i n t e r e s t ,  and deviations of real disposable income from 
trend. 
As discussed earlier,  it seems plausible to hypothesize that  a fall fn 
U.S. interest rates, stock market returns, real estate returns, and economic 
activity would be associated w i t h  an increase in the capital  inflow to Latin 
America whlch would be at least part ly  reflected in an increase in the 
regional ind l ce s  for reserves and the real exchange rate (the latter 
indicating a real exchange rate appreciation). Most of the evidence 
on s imple  pafrwise correlation coefficients I s  indeed in t h i s  direction 
(Table 7 ) .  Notice that the correlations of the U.S. variables with the real  
exchange rate index are lower (bu t  st i l l  substantial) than those of the 
reserves index. 
Having assessed the degree of cross-country comovernent in reserves and 
the real exchange rate, we now examlne the dynamic interaction between these 
t w o  variables in each country. Combintng Charts 2 and 3 indicates a pattern 
of comovement whereby the increase in reserves precedes the real 
appreciation in the exchange rate. 2J This temporal pattern differs from 
Notice t h a t ,  as shown in Chart 3 ,  Brazil's real exchange rate 
depreciated through most of the sample period and its upturn came fairly 
late in the sample. Thus, it is not surprising to f ind that the regional 
exchange rate index, the first princfpal component, does poorly in capturing 
its fluctuations, In ef fect ,  t h e i r  correlation is negative. These details 
are available upon request. 
Morande (1988) noted this pat tern  of interaction for the case of Chile 
in the previous capital inflow episode of 1977-82. 
what would have emerged had there been a shock to the external terms of 
trade, and\or to the real exchange rate,  which was followed by accommodating 
reserve accumulation. In order to more formally investigate this issue, we 
performed Granger causality t e s t s  for each of the ten countries using 
monthly data from January 1988 to Novembex 1991. The tests  were performed 
on the logarithms of the levels of the variables and each equation included 
a constant and a time trend. Since the t e s t s  could be affected by the 
number of lags included in the right hand s i d e  of each equation, and given 
that we had no strong priors on th i s  issue, we used the Akaike and Schwarz 
criteria to select among one-, t h r e e - ,  s i x - ,  nine-, and 12-month lag 
p r o f i l e s .  lJ Both criteria,  unless otherwise noted, yielded three lags as 
optimal. 
Table 8 presents the  F-tests of exclusion restrictions and their 
attendant probability values. The causal patterns are not uniform across 
countries, which is not surprising since the countries in our sample have 
different exchange rate regimes and the po l i cy  response to the capital  
inflows has varied considerably across countries. Inferences obviously 
depend on the significance level adopted, however, the most  common pattern 
that prevails (Braz i l ,  Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela) is one in which 
reserves Granger-cause the real exchange rate. 2/ For Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Mexico the causal relationship runs both ways. 3J For Uruguay, the  
real exchange rate causes reserves, while for Ecuador and Peru there is no 
evidence of a causal relationship between reserves and the real exchange 
rate. 
To verify whether our constructed indices, the f i r s t  pr inc ipal  
components of reserves and the real exchange rate, p l o t t e d  in Chart 7 ,  are 
indeed representative a£ the regional patterns, Granger-causality tests were 
also performed on these series. The F- t e s t s ,  reported at the bottom of 
Table 8 ,  indicate that ,  at standard significance levels, there is evidence 
of  an unidirectional causal link from the first principal component of 
reserves to the  f i rs t  principal component of the  real exchange rate. 
Intuitively, what the regional indices are capturing is tha t  in seven of the 
ten countries the re  is a causal link from reserves so the real exchange 
rate,  but only in four countries is the reverse true. On balance, it seems 
For simulation evidence on the efficacy of these criteria, see 
Lutkepohl (1985). 
2/ Since the sample is small and the collinearity problems common to 
- 
VAR's are present, limiting the precisian of the estimates, we consider 
significance levels of 25 percent or below. In any case, the reader may use 
the marginal significance levels reported in Table 8 in order to check 
inferences under di f ferent  levels. 
In these cases, it could be argued that the p o l i c i e s  and events t h a t  
led to an appreciation in the real exchange rate are a l s o  responsible for 
attracting c a p i t a l  from abroad. 
Tabre 8. Causality Tests 
1988:l to 1991:f 1 
p 
Resemen Equation Real Exchange Rate Equation 
Country F-atatistic Probability value F-statistic Probabnity value 
Argentina 
beem - - 289 
- 
(0.048) 
kdExch l ln~w 2.503 ( 0 . m  - 
Bolivia 
Fbs5rves - - 1.501 
- 
(0.229) 
Real Exchange Rede 2.009 (0..129) - 
Brazil 
Re-- - - 3.74 (0.01 a) 
Raal Exchange we-  0.221 (o.aat1 - - 
Chile 
Aeswvad - - 7 p176) 
Real kchangs We 0.523 (0.669) - - 
Cafornbla "I 
Resews - - 1.423 (0.235) 
Real Exchenge Rate 0.689 (0.6601 .. - 
i.m (0.403) 
Real brchwge Rak 0,561 (5.644) 
5.353 (0.003) 
0.- (0.4223 
Real ExehmQb Rate l.m (0.m 
0.534 (0.862) 
2122 (0.113) 
Real €xchmge W 0.302 (0.824) 
5.511 ( 0 . a )  
1IAccording to the Akalks and Schwerz erltsrlalhe optimal lag length wss shr months. 
?./When mom 1- are induded there is avidence of unidmctional causali fnwn rssews Po the ma1 exchange rate. 
WThem am t h m  first $rtcipal components d retiema and the mal exchenge mta plotted in Chart 6. 
Chart 7. FIRST PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS 
Regional Index of the 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Regional Index of 
Official Reserves 
N o t e s :  A n  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r e a l  e l l s c t t v e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i n d e x  d e n o t e s  a n  a p p r e c i a t i o n .  
Prbncipal  c o m p o n e n t s  i n d t c e s  a r e  c o n s t r u c t e d  to  h a v e  a z e r o  m e a n  a n d  unit v a r i a n c e  

safe to characterize the present episode as one in which the reserve 
accumulation preceded the seal exchange rate appreciation. U 
2. Quantifvin~ the r o l e  of external factors 
In t h i s  subsection, the role of external factors f o r  capital inflows 
and real exchange rates is quantitatively assessed. The analysis proceeds 
in two stages: we f i r s t  construct indices of the unobserved external factors 
(or impulses), which are then incorporated in a structural VAR. We perform 
t e s t s  of exclusion restrictions on the foreign factors to determine their  
statistical significance and compute variance decompositions to quantify 
their relative importance in accounting for forecast error variance of 
reserves and real exchange rates.  Last, impulse response functions show how 
reserves and real exchange rates react in the presence of an external shock. 
I n  modeling the external impulses, one could consider a whole vector  of 
variables that could have an impact on Latin American economies. Here we 
opted for an unobserved index model, where the constructed index is 
correlated with the observed t i m e  series f o r  the United Sta tes  that appear 
in Table 7. Specifically, we constructed and used the first and second 
principal components a£ these series. Chart 8 illustrates how closely the 
first principal component captures the j oinc movement of che various 
interest rates and economic activity in the United States. The second 
principal component captures swings in returns on the equity and real estate 
markets . 
Having now a measure of external Lmpulses, we embedded them in a 
structural vector autoregression. Defining PClt and PC2t as the f irst  and 
second principal components of the U.S. variables and denoting the logs of 
reserves and the real exchange rate by BESt and REXt, respectively, the 
reduced form of the system is given by: 
lJ The contemporaneous relationship between reserves and the real 
exchange rate ,  about which Granger causality tests are silent, is explored 
in the next subsection. 
As equation (1) illustrates, w e  allow for dynamic interaction between 
the foreign factors but impose their temporal exogeneity by not including 
lagged values of the endogenous variables, reserves and the real exchange 
rate, in their respective equations (i. e . 613-62i-6 1i-6 '2i-0 ) ; 
hence, we fmpose structure on the temporal relationships between these 
variables. IJ Each equation kn the system includes a constant and a t i m e  
trend. The reduced-form residuals, the ut's, depend on the structural 
errors, et, and the contemporaneous xelatianships between the endogenous 
variables, specifically, uc - ecA. 
Next, we consider the structure of the matrix A ,  whtch describes the 
contemporaneous relationships between the variables. In the general case, a 
causal ordering amounts to assuming that the endogenous variables enter the 
system in a triangular form, with the first equation containing one 
endogenous variable,  the second t w o  variables, and so on, giving a spec i f ic  
form to the A matrix. Instead, we follow the methodology of Bernanke (1986) 
and Blanchard (1989), in that a p r i o r i  (structural) restrictions are imposed 
on the identifying matrix. Specifically, since there is a presumption t h a t  
the foreign factors are exogenous, we do not  allow for feedback from shocks 
to the domestic variables (reserves and the real exchange rate) to the 
reduced form error of the first and second principal components of the 
foreign variables. In additfon, we impose the restriction that the 
p r i n c i p a l  component indices are orthogonal by construction, so that they 
depend on t h e i r  own shocks, as in equations (2) and ( 3 )  below: 
while reserves are affected by the structural shocks to  the foreign 
variables and by its own shock, 
REX RE+ = a,,PClt  + a,ZPC2t + ah3RESt + et 
lJ Our procedure is similar to the DYMIMIC models associated w i t h  Watson 
and Engle (19831, and Stock and Watson (1989). One key difference in the 
approaches is that  here we adopt a two-step procedure by f i r s t  constructing 
the unobserved factor index (indices) and then incorporating t h a t  factor(s) 
in a dynamic model. 
Chart 8. THE EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
Firrl Plrncipal hmponeri: 
Sources. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  C1.S. Depar tment  af Commerce  and  
the aulhors.  
Note: Principal component i n d i c e s  are constructed to have zero mean  and unit variance. 

The real exchange rate in t h i s  ordering is allowed to respond to a l l  of the 
shocks. 
After the system was estimated using monthly data from January 1988 to 
November 1991, w e  t e s t e d  f o r  the significance of the foreign factors. 
Table 9 summarizes the results of the t e s t s  for exclusion restrictions, 
t e s t s  that involve the temporal relationships. The null hypothesis being 
t e s t e d  is that the foreign variables do not  affect reserves and the real 
exchange rate. The high  X 2  - s t a t i s t i c s  and low probability values indicate 
that in eight of the ten countries, one can reject the null hypothesis at 
the 75 percent level of confidence or higher. Only in half of the sample 
countries there is any evidence of a significant contemporaneous 
relationship between the foreign factors and reserves and/or the real 
exchange rate. 
While Table 9 provides evidence only on the statistical significance of 
the relationships between the variables, it is also useful to assess the 
relative importance of the foreign impulses. For th i s  purpose, we examined 
variance decompositions and the impulse responses of the real exchange rate 
and o f f i c i a l  reserves. Two observations are worth noting from the results 
of the variance decompositions of real exchange rate forecast errors 
presented in Table 10. First, for most countries a s izable  fraction of 
about 50 percent of the monthly forecast error variance in the real exchange 
ra te  is accounted f o r  by foreign factors. Second, there appears to be a 
pattern among the countries considered. Foreign factors explain the 
greatest share of the variance of the real exchange rate in countries that 
experienced no maj or changes in domestic p o l i c i e s  in the period under 
consideration, 1988-1991. Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador had 
implemented thelr stabilization programs well before our sample 
started.  2/ Foreign factors explain the least  f o r  Argentina, B r a z i l ,  and 
Mexico,  and Venezuela all countries where significant changes in domestic 
policies took place during our sample. Peru, however, does n o t  f i t  
i n t o  chis  pattern as domestic po l i cy  underwent sharp changes and yet foreign 
factors play a dominant role in explaining t h e  variance of reserves and the 
real exchange rate. &/ 
Hlcernarrlve oraerlngs are exprorea. une alrernarlve lmposes tnae  tnere 
be no contemporaneous relationship between reserves and the real exchange 
rate, while another treats reserves as the most "endogenousn variable in the 
system, The results do not  di f fer  appreciably from those presented here. 
2 /  Bolivia's program began in August of 1985; Colombia had programs in 
1985-86 ; while Chi le  ' s stabilization dates to the Tablita. 
Argentina has had three stabilization glans during the period 
considered, while Brazi l  had four. The Mexican plan began in December 1987 
and is continuing. Venezuela f loated its exchange rate in January of 1989. 
4J The Peruvian stabilization program began in August 1990, hence it 
- 
falls beyond the midpoint of our sample, making it d i f f i c u l t  to group it 
with the other countries. 
Table 9. Tests for the Slgnifieanca of the Foreign Factors 
1988:l to 1Wl:ll  
I / According to the Akaike and Sehwan criteria the optimal lag length was slx months. 
I 
r -- Test for Excfusfon RestrIetiona Contemporanaous - R.e!_ahg-s_hlp# 
Chi-Squared a3 1 a ~ 2  a4 I a,z 
Country Statistic 
Argentina 
14.981 0.091 -0.451 -0.225 -0.14 
(0.242) (0.243) n.a. (0.405) n.a. 
Bollvia 
16.167 4.092 0.5331 0.011 0.04j 
@.I84 (0.170) (0.045) (0.030) n.a. 
Brazll 
23.224 Q.W5 0.481 0.043 0.323 
(0.026) (0.0ll) n.a. (0.327) n.a. 
, Chllm 
29.527 -0.433 -0.246 4.018 0.545 
(0.003) (0.041) (0.026) (0,152) n.8. 
Colombia l t  
31.548 -0.014 4.W8 0.009 0.024 
( 0 - w  (0.1 57) n.a. (0.176) n.8. 
Ecuador 
17.285 -0.230 0.660 -0.07 1.359 
(0.1 39) (0.139) (0.082) (0 376) n.a. 
Mexico 
23.203 0.138 -0.324 -0.0% -0.083 @-ow (0.21 6) ma. n.a. (0.627) 
Peru 
25.058 0.121 0.15 0.022 0.203 
(0.01 5) (0.061) (0.017) (0.128) n.a. 
Uruguay 
t 1.275 4.042 0.197 0.05 0.076 
(0.505) (0.042) (0.012) (0.153) n . a  
Venezuela 
9.342 -0.045 -0.28 0.003 0.743 
@. 673) ( 0 . W  n.a. (0.054) n.a. 
-- 
T a b l e  I D .  D e c o  rn p o s i t i o n  o f  V a r i a n c e :  R a a l  E x c h a n g e  R a t s  
Country 
BRAZIL  
CHILE 
COLOMBIA 
ECUADOR 
PERU 
URUGUAY 
VENEZUELA 
Months Standerd Foreign Rmserves Real  Exchanga  
Error Factor Rate  
Foreign factors also account for a s i zab le  fraction of the monthly 
reserves' forecast error variance in most of the countries considered, as is 
clear from the variance decompositions presented in Table 11. It turns out 
tha t  the explanatory power of the foreign factors is Least fox Argentina and 
Venezuela and most for Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador. As before, P e r u  does 
not f i t  into the general pattern. 
Last, we turn to impulse response functions. Charts 9 and 10 depict  
for the ten countries in our sample the response of reserves and the real 
exchange rate to a one-standard-deviation shock to the first principal 
component of the fo re ign  variables. As indicated earlier, and as 
illustrated by Chart 8 ,  a positive shock to the first principal component of 
foreign variables could well be interpreted as ref lect ing a positive shock 
to short-term U.S. interest rates. If th i s  shock is associated with a 
deereased capital outflow from the United S t a t e s ,  then it could be 
associated with a permanent decrease in reserves and a real exchange rate 
depreciation in Latin America. L/ For most countries In the Charts there 
is evidence in support of this hypothesized pattern. However, there are 
exceptions. In particular,  reserves rise in Brazil and Uruguay in response 
to th i s  shock, which also induces a sustained real appreciation in Ecuador. 
In more d e t a i l ,  the mast common response pattern in Chart 9 (for 
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru) is one in which reserves 
decline as capital flows ou t .  When capital ceases to leave, reserves 
stabilize at a lower level. The response is different in the case of Brazil 
and Uruguay, where reserves rise in response to an increase in the foreign 
first pr inc ipa l  component. This result is n o t  surprising, since as Chart 2 
illustrated and principal component analysis confirmed, in the recent 
episode reserves are a poor proxy for c a p i t a l  flows in both these countries. 
The response of reserves in Bolivia, Chile and Venezuela is more difficult 
to interpret since there are episodes of both reserve accumulation and 
depletion in the wake of an external shock. 
The most common pattern of response of the real exchange rate in 
Chart 10 to an increase in the f i rs t  foreign principal  component (for 
Argentina, Bol iv ia ,  Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela) shows a 
permanent real depreciation. 2J Confirming that ,  in most of the cases 
considered, an increase in interest  rates abroad induces a c a p i t a l  outflow 
from these countries. The response of Brazil end Peru shows an initial 
exchange rate depreciation followed by a real appreciation. And, it is 
d i f f i c u l t  to explain the sustained appreciation in the case of Ecuador. 
Had we considered the change i n  reserves ( a  flow) and the rate of 
change of the exchange rate instead of levels, the impact of the shock would 
be expected to die out .  
2/ Sometimes following a short-lived appreciation, as in t h e  case of 
- 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile Mexico, and Uruguay. 
Chart 9. RESPONSE OF OFFICIAL RESERVES TO A ONE-STAHOARD DEVIATION 
SHOCK IN THE FlRST FOREIGN FACTOR 
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Chart 10. RESPONSE OF THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE TO A ONE-STANDARD O E V l A f l O N  
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Teh lu  11 .  D e c o  rn posit ion o f  Var iance:  O f f i c i a l  R e n e r v e s  
Country Months Stmndard Forelgn Ra8arve8 Real Exchangm 
Error Factor Rats 
ARGEMTIMA 
BOLIVIA 
BRAZlL 
t 0.45681 48.9391 9 53.06081 0,00000 
6 0.91 673 28.1 4076 12.181 18 58.97806 
12 0.96520 23.90786 48.21 955 27.87258 
2 4  1.00502 29.24230 44.64877 26.10894 
1 0.23538 3.58334 96.41666 0 .00000  
6 0.51 332 38.85957 37.46749 23.67283 
12 0.56842 45.6471 5 30.53305 23.81 980 
24 0.57043 45.79405 30.39260 23.81 334 
1 0.21 850 50.421 31 49,57869 0.00000 
0.5041 9 51.42822 t 2 . I  831 5 37.38864 
0.50753 51.80626 11.05340 37.1 4034 1 i 0.51 127 52.48231 10.89270 36 .62499  
CHILE 
COLOMBIA 
ECUADOR 
MEXICO 
PERU 
URUGUAY 
VENEZUELA 
t 0.06433 26.33 564 73.68436 0.00000 
6 0.31 686 52.47484 8.98409 40.541 07 
12 0.51 446  54.32670 2.77981 42.89349 
24 0.55935 54.62069 2.35332 43.02599 
1 0.30034 49.59436 50.40564 0.00000 
6 0.39903 48.4261 5 34.93906 16.63480 
12 0.43321 51.63858 29.6571 9 18.70423 
24  0.46430 56.26968 25.83819 17.91 21 3 
1 0.21 397 21.531 41 78.46859 0.00000 
6 0.57710 53.1 8437 1 3.92941 32.88822 
12 0.64250 54.41 525 11.24tg9 34.34276 
24 0.66759 57.76005 10.41295 31.82700 
1 D.4156B 43.95007 56.04993 0.OOOOO 
6 1.75335 43.85579 4.49773 51.64648 
12 2.1 761 3 46.02234 3.041 34 50,93632 
24 2.2641 3 48.26566 2.82230 48.91 204 
1 0.09005 15.75783 84.24237 0.00000 
8 0.4471 6 43.68233 13.1 991 3 43.1 1 E55  
12 0.53946 49.1 7582 10.681 0 3  40.1 431 5 
24 0.62003 56.02963 8.64497 33.32541 
1 0.06563 24.93584 75.0841 6 0.00000 
6 0.22244 59 -47827 10.49866 38.02307 
12 0.28747 52.5921 9 6.3Q428 41.5 0353 
24 0.3031 0 54.67203 5.68823 39.63973 
1 0.091 70 26 .OW30 78.961 70 0.00000 
6 0.26690 31.51 3 20 24.541 82 43.9471 8 
12 0.301 08  29.79581 25.53228 44.671 91 
24 0.32257 30.13876 25.20937 44.65187 
In sum, the evidence from the impulse responses indicates that a 
negative shock to U . S .  interest rates would, ceteris paribus, generate an 
accumulation of official reserves and a real exchange rate appreciation in 
most of the countries considered, although puzzling exceptions remain. 
V. Pol i cy  Imvlicarions 
The foregofng empirical analysts suggests that external factors have 
played a role in recent developments In the region. These capital  flows, in 
tu rn ,  have contributed to the accumulation of foreign reserves and 
appreciation of the real exchange rate in Latin America. With these 
stylized facts  as background, and taking into account the possibility t h a t  
external factors nay reverse their course in the future and result in 
capital outflows from L a t i n  America, the next relevant set of issues. 
concerns the form and timing of the appropriate policy response. 
Given that the 1980s has been a period of capital shortage for h t i n  
America, the first question in discussing policy responses is: what is the 
ratf onale for pol icy  to interfere wt th present c a p i t a l  inflows? Several 
countries in the region are in the process of concluding successful 
negotfations with their creditors, and effectively coming t o  grips  with 
their f i sca l  imbalances. Thus, why would c a p i t a l  inflows--which in 
countries like Chile and Mexfce have financed larger private investment---be 
undesirable? 
There are at l eas t  three types of concerns that policymakers tend t o  
voice about capital inflows: (1)  since capital  inflows are typically 
associated with real exchange rate appreciation and with increased exchange 
rate volatility, these may have adverse effects, especially in the export 
sector; (2) c a p i t a l  inflows--particularly when massive--may not be properly 
intermediated and, therefore, may lead to a misallacation of resources; 
( 3 )  capital  Tnflows--especially when aE a "hat money" variety--could be 
reversed on short notice, possibly leading to a domestic financial c r i s i s .  
These concerns are not new. Actually, it has been argued that the depth of 
the debt crisis in the 1980s had a lot to do with the magnitude and 
sudden reversal of international capital flows. The remainder of t h i s  
section examines the foundations of these concerns and their policy 
implications. 2J 
Evidently the development of the export sector has laid the foundations 
for technolagical advance and economic growth in mast Latin American 
1/ In terms of economic agents in Latin America, it is also poss ible  to 
- 
interpret these developments as origfnating in a part fo l io  shift  away from 
foreign ( d o l l a r  denominated) and toward domestic financial and physical 
assets. For a model in which such a portfolio shift leads to a temporary 
appreciation of the real exchange r a t e  and to accumulation of reserves by 
the central bank, see Calvo (1983). 
2J For a discussion of these issues from the perspective of Chilean 
monetary and exchange rate policies, see Zahler (1992) .  
countries. Noreover, in highly-indebted countries, the behavior of exports 
has been an important indicator of creditworthiness; fox example, the 
ratios of external debt to exports and debt service to exports are routinely 
used in assessing country risk. Thus, changes in exports associated with 
capital inflows may have economy-wide ef fects ,  and hysteresis effects, that 
are n o t  fully internalized by the private sector--thus providing a rationale 
f o r  pol icy  intervention. 
In turn, improper intermediation (case ( 2 )  above) could be the result 
of ( i )  speculative '%bubbles, " (ii) fmpraperly- p r f  ced {explicit or imp1 ic i t )  
government insurance, (iii) lack of policy c r e d i b i l i t y ,  (iv) market failure 
(e  . g . , externalities, economies of scale, nominal wage/prica rigidity) , or 
some combination of the above. 
The bubbles hypothesis i s  a highly appealing one in policy 
circles .  However, leaving aside its empirical foundations, it does not 
immediately follow that a bubbles equilibrium calls for government 
intervention. For instance, a clear case for intervention would be obtafned 
if the government had b e t t e r  information than the public and could thus 
prevent the creation of a speculative bubble. However, it is doubtful t h a t  
the government knows more than financial specialists ; hence, intervention 
could be ineffective and even counterproductive. 
Another, and less controversial, case for  intervention is one in which 
the speculative bubble is driven by the expectation that government will 
eventually s t e p  in and b a i l  out speculators when the bubble bursts. In 
point  of fact ,  these bubbles are associated with phenomena {ii) and (iii)  
above, and are not  pure bubbles. Be as it may, however, optimal policy to 
prevent t h i s  type of bubble could simply consist of setting up appropriate 
mechanisms to prevent government from eventually bailing out speculators. 
In other wards, it may be optimal to make a credible commitment that 
pdvernment will not intervene if and when the bubble bursts. 
In practice, however, governments may be unable to make such 
commitments credible, especially when these involve the possibility of bank 
failures. As the recent experience in the United S t a t e s  and Latin America 
shows, it may not be poss ib le  to credibly s t a t e  that bank depos i t s  are not 
fully guaranteed by government if banks ware to run into financial 
difficulties. As a result, banks may end up receiving free deposit  
insurance. 21 Thus, under these circumstances, a natural proposal is to 
require banks to join a mandatory deposit insurance scheme. Such a scheme, 
however, will have to  be highly sophisticated--indeed, much more 
sophisticated than those prevailing in more advanced countries. For 
lJ ProfessionaL opinion is divided on t h i s  issue (see StfglLtz (1990)). 
Actually, unless banks are forced to pay far deposit Insurance, free 
market forces may not generate a privately-based deposit insurance scheme. 
This is so, because the expectation of free insurance if banks run i n t o  
financfal difficulties may make any privately-based deposit insurance scheme 
unprofitable. 
example, such a scheme would have to take in to  account the probability ef a 
massive funds' withdrawal if external conditions were reverted. 
Consequently, in the short run It may be more practical to j u s t  preclude 
banks from intermediating much of the new capital inflow by increasing 
required r e s e n e  ratios. Regulations could also make banks less vulnerable 
t o  speculative bubbles in other markets (e.g. equi ty  and real e s t a t e  
markets) that are the byproduct of massive capital  inflows. In particular, 
by l imit ing the investments of banks in these markets, the banking system 
would be better insulated at the t i m e  the bubble bursts. JJ 
As pointed out above, a third rationale for po l fcpakers '  concerns with 
capital inflows is based on the fear of a quick reversal of these inflows. 
Such a reversal may exacerbate the negative effects of improper 
intermediation, and may in fact pive rise to improper fntermediation. In an 
environment characterized by asymmetric information, a sudden capital 
outflow may induce lenders to conclude that the country has suffered a 
negative supply shack, say, even when no shock has occurred. The sudden 
capital  flight, in  turn, may brfng about the dlscontinuatian of e f f i c i en t  
investment projects. Thus, if start-up costs  for those projects are 
significant (because of, e . g . ,  increasing returns ta scale or market 
failure), their discontinuation provokes a deadweight loss whfch, from the 
lenders' point of view, may be observationally equivalent to an exogenous 
negative aupply shock. Consequently, the expectations that gave rise to 
these detrimental c a p i t a l  outflows may turn out to be rattonal. Thus, this 
self-fulfilling-prophecy example gives another reason f o r  intervention. The 
example also shows that policy intervention may be called for even when the 
funds are channelled to investment proj ecta . 
Based on the foregoing discussion, w e  consider five different 
intervention policies: 
(1) a tax on capital  imports; 
(2) trade policy; 
(3) fiscal tightening ; 
(4) central bank s t er i l i z ed  and non-sterilized intervention of 
c a p i t a l  inflows ; 
(5) a rise in marginal r e s e w e  requirements on bank deposrts and 
more regulated bank investments En equity and real 
estate markets. 
T a x e s  on short-term borrowing abroad were imposed in numerous 
countries--e.g., in Israel and Chile in 1978 and 1991 respectively. 
Although this policy is effective in the short run, experience suggests that 
the private sector is quick in finding ways to dodge those taxes through 
over- and under-invoicing of imports and exports and increased reliance on 
parallel financial and foreign exchange markets. 
lJ Point (iv) above, market failure, w i l l  not be discussed here. A n  
important example, however, is associated w i t h  the export sec tor  which, as 
shown before, is likely to produce externalities in the rest of the economy. 
There are various trade policy measures that can help to insulate the 
export sector from real exchange rate appreciation. A natural candidate is 
higher export subsidies, However, this policy has a f i s ca l  c a s t  and 
distorts resource allocation between exportables and impartables. The 
f i s ca l  cost could be substantial.  For example, to offset  a 20 percent 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate through export subsidies would 
increase f i s c a l  expenditures by about 4 percent of GDP, given that the 
average export/gdp ratio for Latin America hovers around 20 percent. 
Alternatively, the authorities could increase both export subsidies 
import tariffs in the same proportfon--so as to avoid creating further 
relative discrepancies between internal to external terms of trade--& 
announce that those subsidies/tariffs w i l l  be phased out in the future. 
Indeed, i f  the private sector perceives these measures as transitory, agents 
are likely to substitute future for present expenditure, contributing to 
cool off the economy and to attenuate the real exchange rate appreciation. 
The fiscal cost of th i s  package need not be large, partkular ly  if the trade 
deficit is small. Furthermore, static distortions are not increased, since 
such trade policy does not change inftial relative price distortions between 
exports and imports. However, th i s  policy can be criticized on two 
different  grounds. First, i t s  effectfveness depends on the private sector 
believing that those subsfdies/tariffs will be phased out in the future; 
otherwise, there is no reason for individuals ta lower present expenditure. 
Thus, the effectiveness of the policy depends very strongly on credibility-- 
both the credibility of policy, and the credibility of price forecasts-- 
which cannot be taken for granted. Second, t h i s  policy- -as the previous one 
involving only subsidies--deviates from the general present worldwide trend 
towards commercial opening and free-trade agreements, which include 
reduction of tariffs and subsidies as its key components. 
Another policy reaction to the capital-inflows problem could be to 
tighten the fiscal stance of the public sector (policy ( 3 )  above) through 
higher taxes or lower government expenditure. While t h i s  policy is not 
likely to s top  the capital  inf low,  it may lower aggregate demand and 
therefore may cushion the inflationary impact of capital  inflows. L/ In 
that context, higher taxes may be much less effective than lower government 
expenditure. To see this, n a t k e  tha t  when credit is widely available--as 
is the case when the country is subject to massive capital inflows- - 
i n d i v i d u a l s ~ x p e n d i t u r e s  can be largely independent of their tax l i a b i l i t y .  
Tfiis is especially true if higher taxes are expected to be transitory--a 
somewhat plausible expectation since higher taxes would be associated with 
transitory capi ta l  inflows.  In contrast,  lower government expenditure-- 
particularly when this expenditure is directed to the purchase of 
nontradable goods and services--has a direct impact on aggregate demand, 
which is unlikely to be offset by an expansion of private sector demand. 
Unfortunately, however, contraction of government expenditure is always a 
1/ In addition, to the extent that it reduces the government's need to 
- 
issue debt, a tighter fiscal stance is also likely to lower domestic 
interest rates. 
highly sensitive political issue. Overall, it is hard t o  provide a strong 
case for adjusting f i s ca l  polfcy--which is usually set on the basis o f  
medium or long-term consfderations--in response to short-term fluctuations 
in international capital flows. However, if the authorities had envisioned 
a tightening of the f i s ca l  stance, the presence of capital inflaw may call 
for earlier action in this respect. 
Sterilized intervention has been the most popular policy response to 
the present episode of capital  inflows in Latin America. Leading examples 
of this policy are provided by Chile in 1990-91 and Colombia in 1991. Under 
capi ta l  inflows, t h i s  type of intervention amounts to a central bank s a l e  of 
government bonds in exchange far  foreign currencies and securities. IJ' 
This policy does nor necessarily stop private agents from engaging in 
international loan transactions. However, if successful, it insulates the 
stock of domestic money from variations associated with capital  mobility. 
Thus,  through sterilization the central bank reduces the supply of money 
from the level  it would have attained, had the public been l e f t  free to 
acquire money at the current exchange rate. Consequently, if effective, 
sterilization of capftal inflows will tend to increase domestic nominal and 
real interest rates. The latter lowers aggregate demand and, thus, results 
in a less appreciated real exchange rate. 2J 
There are t w o  main difficulties with s t e r i l i z e d  intervention under 
present circumstances. Firs t ,  sterilization leads to an increase in the 
differential between the interest rate on domestic government debt and 
international reserves, thus creating a fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) d e f i c i t .  
Second, by preventing a sharp f a l l  in the domestic/fareign interest rate, 
differenrial  sterilization tends to perpetuate the capi ta l  inflow thus 
exacerbating any problems caused by th i s  inflow. The impact of 
sterilization on the interest differential can be seen in Chart 11, which 
compares sterilizing, such as Chile and Colombia, agatnst nonsterilizing 
cases such as Argentina. It is seen that in the current capital-inflows 
episode, the domestic interest rate exhibits a much slower decline (or even 
actually increases) in s t er i l i z tng  than in non-sterilizing countries. The 
evidence from the recent experience of Chile and Colombfa indicates that 
s t e r i l i z e d  intervention has not  reduced capital inflows. Yet, the increase 
in the fiscal deficit may be quite substantial; for example, Rodriguez 
For a more d e t a i l e d  discussion of the role of central bank ( s t e r i l i z e d  
and nonsterilised) intervention, see Mussa (1981) and Obstfeld (1991). 
A necessary condition far  these outcomes, and for t h e  effectiveness of 
s t e r i l i z e d  Intervention, is that  domestic and foreign bonds are imperfect 
substitutes in agents' portfclios. Casual observation suggests that t h i s  
seems to be the case in Latin America. Cumby and Obstfeld (1983) produced 
econometric results f o r  Mexico in the 1970s in support of Imperfect 
substitutability between peso-denominated assets and foreign a s s e t s .  For 
industrial countries, Obstfeld (1991) concludes that sterilized intervention 
is a weak instrument of exchange rate policy, and that monetary and f i s c a l  
p o l i c i e s ,  and not intervention per-se, have been the main policy 
determinants of exchange rates in recent years. 
Chart 1 2 .  DOMESTIC LENOING RATES IN US. DOLfAFlS 
(paria d rver.ges) 
ARGENTINA 
lsni n 
CHILE 
S o u r c e s :  In ternat ional  F inancia l  S ta l i s t ics ,  I M F  a n d  v a r i o u s  Central B a n k  0u I l e t ins  

(1991) estimates the fiscal burden of sterilized intervention in Colombia 
during 1991 at about 0.5 percent of GDP. Consequently, serious doubts can 
be cast on the des frab i l i ty  of  s ter i l i zed  intervention i n  the present 
episode in Latin America, where countries are still attempting to solve 
their domestic and international debt difficult%es, and t h e i r  public sector 
budgets require further trimming. lJ 
Alternatively, the central bank could o p t  for nonsterilized 
intervention, whereby the central bank purchases the foreign exchange 
brought in by the capital inflow in exchange for domestic money--as, e . g . ,  
under a f i x e d  exchange rate .  This policy can help avoid nominal exchange 
rate apprecfation, and is likely to narrow the domesticJforeign interest 
rate differential; however, it is likely to generate an increase in the 
domestic monetary base beyond the central  bank's target. The latter, in 
turn, caul6 fuel inflationary pressures and contribute to appreciate the 
real exchange rate. It is at this point that c r e d i b i l i t y  considerations 
about maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate come into play. In this 
connection, floating exchange rates have an edge, because the required real 
exchange rate appreciation does net necessarily c a l l  for inflation t o  
accelerate. Furthermore, floating rates allow the domestic central bank to 
operate a s  a "lender o f  las t  resort." In contrast, under fixed rates and 
fractional-reserve banking, preventing liquidity-type financial crises-- 
particularly, when capital starts  f lowing out--may call for the central bank 
to hold a large stock of international reserves--a costly if not  unfeasible 
undertaking. ZJ Therefore, these credibility-related considerations give 
some support to a regime a£ floating exchange rates when the economy is 
subject  to substantial cap i ta l  flaws. 2/ 
As dfscussed earlier,  attempting to insulate the banking system from 
short-term capital flows is an attractive goal in cases where most of the 
inflows take the form of fncreased short term bank deposits. In these 
circumstances, a sudden reversal af capital inflows may quickly result in 
bank failures. Under po l i cy  (5) above, marginal reserve requirements could 
be sharply raised such t h a t  they become higher as the maturity of  d e p o s i t s  
shortens; in fact, a 100 percent required-reserve ratio could be imposed on 
d e p o s i t s  wlth the shortest maturity. While this scheme would impose a 
burden on the banking system, and could result in some disintermediation of 
the capital  inflows, it has the advantage of decreasing banks' exposure to 
See also Calvo (199P), which provides an example in which social 
welfare always declines with sterilization, and in which the effectiveness 
of sterilization relies on i ts  worsening the credibility of an undergoing 
stabilization program, 
2J The problem is exacerbated when, like in most Latin American 
countries, the Piabtl i t ies  of the banking system are heavily biased towards 
short-term deposits, enhancing the chances of a run against the domestic 
banking system. 
When the system is not subject to big swings of international c a p i t a l ,  
the opposite conclusion can be reached: f i x e d  rates may dominate. See 
Calvo and ~ h g h  (1991). 
the risks of capital  flow reversals. In addition, regulation that limits 
the exposure of banks to the volatility in equity and real e s t a t e  markets 
would further insulate the banking system from the  bubbles associated with 
sizable capital inflows. 
To summarize, there are grounds to support a policy intervention mix 
based on the imposition o f  a tax on short-term capital  imports, an enhancing 
the (downward) flexibility of exchange rates, and on raising marginal 
reserve requirements on short-term bank deposits. Given the l i k e l y  f i s ca l  
costs it is hard to make a strong case in favor of s t er i l i z ed  intervention, 
unless countries exhibit a strong fiscal stance, and capital inflows are 
expected to be short-lived. In any ease, we believe that none of the above 
policies will drastically change the behavior of real exchange rates or 
interest rates f o r  an extended period of time. The choice of appropriate 
policies, however, could decidedly attenuate the detrimental effects of 
sudden and substantial future capital  outflows. 
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